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REGULATE

1. After the evacuation of Seoul on 4 January 1951, there was no railway transport, and most of the bridges were unusable because of bombing. All transport was handled by the Chinese Communists. There was no traffic during the day; supplies were transported at night, by trucks or by horse or oxcarts.
 2. During February, the highway from Seoul to Chunchon (127-44, 37-52) was crowded with Chinese Communist horse and oxcarts after seven in the evening, with occasional trucks. These trucks traveled without head-lights, although they blinked their lights at times. Their speed was never over ten miles an hour, and they had to stop at bridges or dangerous parts of the road to reconnoiter before advancing. When a UN plane came over, all traffic stopped and remained motionless until the plane had gone. At dawn, all transport moved into villages and was carefully camouflaged among the houses. There was no systematic repair work done on roads and bridges, but when Communist troops came to an impassable section, they repaired it sufficiently to allow them to get through.
 3. Because of the disruption of supply services by UN bombings, in February Chinese troops in the vicinity of Seoul had had no meat since their departure from China three months previously. Fatigue and undernourishment were beginning to tell on the men, and the officers had difficulty making them march at night. The best food available was white rice and Korean "kimchi", but the usual diet was two meals daily of rice and salt. As a result, the troops were weakened and despondent, obeying orders mechanically and without life.
 4. Chinese Communist troops were much afraid of UN planes, to the extent that they limited their activities as far as possible to the night. The couriers who had to travel during the day went singly or in pairs, disguised as women. Soldiers disguised themselves by donning women's skirts, covering their shoulders with white cotton sheets, and draping a white cotton scarf over their caps. Even at short distances, the disguise was effective. If a plane approached, soldiers fell flat in the snow or crouched under trees and boulders or in ditches. Some soldiers, both Chinese and North Korean, also put on the white Korean dress of farmers over their uniforms. Even in this guise they always traveled alone or in groups of no more than four, not in formation.

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CLASSIFICATION

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5. About the middle of February, UN planes reportedly dropped leaflets over Seoul instructing the residents to wear black instead of white clothes. The next morning, some Chinese Communist soldiers appeared on the streets in black civilian suits, and for ten days afterwards most Chinese and North Korean troops within the city wore black clothes.
6. Before the arrival of the Communists, Seoul was alarmed by rumors of their shooting of men at sight and raping of women. When the Chinese proved to be correct in their behavior, the Koreans were very favorably impressed and admired the strict Chinese discipline. The Chinese never laid hands on women and the only stringent measure they enforced was a house to house search for food and clothing. The good treatment by the Chinese was strongly contrasted with the attitude of the North Koreans during their occupation of Seoul in 1950.
7. According to a story current among officials of the Seoul government and members of the North Korean State Security Bureau, in early November 1950 before the troops left China, LIN Piao instructed his forces as follows: "Your enemy in Korea is not the Republic of Korea army but the United States army. In Korea, wherever you are, you must not kill or punish the civilians, but rather protect them." It was under LIN Piao's orders that the North Korean government issued its Military Order No. 71, which forbade the killing of war prisoners and civilians.
8. During February, in a village near Seoul, two Chinese and a North Korean, apparently officers with their interpreter, ordered the village populace to assemble at night and to form a village self-defense unit. They told the people not to worry since the Chinese Communist army would take good care of them and asked their full cooperation. Similar statements were made by Chinese Communist troops during their advance on Seoul to refugees in Kaesong. The North Korean soldiers and civilians frequently said that the good behavior of the Chinese Communists towards Koreans was not only an attempt to gain Korean good will but was also an expression of the basic policy of MAO Tse-tung.
9. The Chinese Communist soldiers were extremely security conscious. They very carefully identified themselves only as belonging to the Chinese People's Volunteer Army and never mentioned units, names, or rank. A direct inquiry about rank drew from one man, apparently an officer, the statement "We have no ranks in the Chinese Communist army. Everybody is equal. We have only the person in charge of a unit, the deputy person in charge, and so forth." The ordinary soldiers were very careful never to give away military information. Mostly they kept their thoughts to themselves and would not express an opinion. Some soldiers stated that they came from South China, but Koreans were unable to determine whether they were telling the truth or had been instructed to give this answer.
10. In Seoul and all other areas, Chinese troops were accompanied by a North Korean soldier to act as guide and interpreter. He also reported on the local situation, and the Chinese were thought to use these reports as a basis for formulating their policy and action. Relations between Chinese Communist and North Korean troops were friendly on the surface, and no instances of open clashes were noticed. By the end of February, however, there was apparently some anti-Korean feeling among the Chinese. Some Communist soldiers in a village near Seoul, undernourished and very low in spirits, told a villager: "We are suffering like this because we have been deceived by the North Korean soldiers. They plotted to bring us here, and now we are doomed to die in a strange land. A great number of our comrades have been killed because of the deceit of the North Korean army."
11. The Chinese shared with the North Koreans a fear that the Americans might use the atomic bomb against them. At a gathering of State Security officials in Seoul in early March, an officer said he had heard that the United States would use the atomic bomb in Korea if the war went against them and that bombs were already available in storage in Japan. This remark threw a shadow over the party. In civilian conversations as well as troop discussions, the atomic bomb was a constant subject, always mentioned with fear. Among civilians, however, the feeling was common that the United States, as a champion of humanity, would not use the bomb without warning, but would drop warning leaflets so that the people could remove to a safe distance.